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During the last two decades, a wave of systemic banking crises has rolled back 
and forth around the globe.  The wave has struck developed and developing countries 
alike, resulting in 112 episodes of systemic crisis in 93 countries and 51 episodes of 
borderline crisis in 46 countries (Figure 1).
1   
Proliferation of large-scale banking crises is disruptive and costly.  Depositors 
lose access to their funds, good borrowers can lose access to credit and even be forced 
into bankruptcy, and some sound banks may be driven out of business.  Would-be issuers 
of debt and equity instruments find that markets have dried up.   And taxpayers are 
typically presented with a large bill for mitigating these disruptions.  The full costs of 
these crises go beyond direct fiscal costs to include such consequences as derailed 
stabilization programs, growth slowdowns and increased poverty.  Still, total fiscal costs 
incurred in the 1997 Thai and Korean crises exceeded 30 percent of GDP, and in 
Indonesia budgetary costs approached 50 percent of GDP.
2    
 When a crisis spreads beyond the banking sector, it triggers a full-fledged 
financial crisis.   The most recent example of this is Turkey where weaknesses in the 
banking system triggered a crisis of confidence in other domestic financial institutions 
and led to a large-scale flight of foreign capital and a severe currency crisis.   
 Both to make systemic breakdowns less likely and to limit the disruption and 
fiscal costs generated when they occur, in every country policymakers erect a financial 
safety net.  A country’s safety net comprises a collection of disruption-mitigating 
financial policies.  These policies include implicit and explicit deposit insurance, lender-
                                                 
1 See Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Mishkin (1996) for a discussion of causes of these crises.  3
of-last-resort facilities at the central bank, specified procedures for investigating and 
resolving bank insolvencies, strategies for regulating and supervising banks, and 
provisions for accessing emergency assistance from multinational institutions such as the 
IMF.     
Among safety net policies, the use of explicit deposit insurance has spread rapidly 
in recent years.  Figure 2 shows that during the last 26 years the number of countries 
offering explicit deposit insurance guarantees has almost tripled.   Establishing a system 
of explicit deposit insurance guarantees has become a principal feature of policy advice 
on financial architecture that outside experts give to developing countries (see Folkerts-
Landau and Lindgren, 1997; and Garcia, 1999).  In 1994, deposit insurance was 
incorporated into the newly created single banking market of the European Union.  
Today, most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing countries feature 
some form of explicit depositor protection. 
It is not hard to see why explicit deposit insurance schemes appeal to 
policymakers.  In the short run, since no immediate budgetary expenditure needs to be 
booked, they represent a seemingly costless solution to problems of  bank runs or panics.  
Besides stabilizing the financial sector, an insurance scheme offers political benefits:  
protecting small depositors and improving opportunities for small banks to compete with 
larger institutions for deposits.  
Mostly dismissed or denigrated by policymakers but long-recognized and 
persistently emphasized by the academics, is the fact that explicit deposit insurance has 
the potential to increase bank risk-taking.  Because it reduces the incentive of depositors 
to monitor banks, deposit insurance can encourage excessive risk-taking ￿ i.e., create 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Total fiscal costs are measured as increases in the stock of public debt relative to GDP in the year if the  4
moral hazard, and reward imprudent banking practices.  But perhaps one of the most 
persuasive arguments in favor of establishing explicit deposit insurance is that it can be 
presented as a way to limit the government￿s commitment to depositors.  Lacking 
coverage limits built into an explicit insurance system, depositors may expect to exert 
enough political pressure to force taxpayers to supply unlimited deposit guarantees ex 
post. Such expectations generate moral hazard too. 
The U.S. was the first country to introduce a national deposit insurance system.  
Its goal was to restore confidence in the liquidity of bank deposits rather than to protect 
small depositors (Golembe, 1960).  Indeed, other means of protecting small depositors 
had long been recognized.  For example, in Europe, savings banks maintained liquidity 
by  investing in safe instruments.  After decades of debate and largely adverse experience 
with moral hazard in state-level schemes, federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933, 
in the midst of a banking crisis.  For the first four decades after its establishment, the 
absence of failures among large institutions fostered the illusion that deposit insurance is 
a low cost way of preventing banking crises.  But the ripening of the Savings and Loan 
insurance mess in the 1980s dispelled this illusion, revealing how substantially deposit 
insurance had exposed taxpayers to loss from risk-taking at insured institutions. 
Modern theorists view deposit insurance design as a multiparty principal-agent 
contracting problem (Kane, 1995; Calomiris, 1996).  Contracting parties consist of banks, 
depositors, supervisors, politicians, and taxpayers.  Events that generate losses for insured 
institutions obligate taxpayers to supply risk capital only when weaknesses in supervisory 
efforts at loss control allow an institution￿s losses to surpass the value of its stockholder-
contributed net worth.  To reduce the chances of future taxpayer losses, authorities in 
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developed countries have since agreed to impose risk-based capital standards and to 
recalibrate these standards when and as regulation-induced innovation undermines their 
effectiveness.  In the U.S., The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Improvement Act of 1991 goes even further, imposing on U.S. regulators a duty to act  
promptly to resolve violations of capital standards.  In 1993, Congress offered U.S. 
taxpayers additional protection by passing the Depositor Preference Act, which in future 
bank liquidations subordinates the claims of non-deposit creditors to those of the FDIC.  
Whether to adopt an explicit deposit insurance system and how to design it 
depend on the financial and supervisory environment in which it must function.  Given 
the potential trade-off between stability and moral hazard, empirical guidance from cross-
country experience promises to be very useful. Figure 2 indicates that the policymakers 
are moving ahead at an alarming rate.  All too often experts that recommend deposit 
insurance either assume countries have an appropriate institutional infrastructure or 
ignore the impact of imperfections in their contracting environments.    
Expert advice needs to be grounded in carefully interpreted cross-country 
empirical evidence.  However, an empirical database on which to test policy advice was 
slow to emerge.  A recent World Bank research project developed such a database for 
researchers worldwide and answered questions about how explicit deposit insurance 
affects financial stability, how markets discipline bank risk-taking, and the development 
of the overall financial system.
3    
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The purpose of this paper is twofold:  to challenge the wisdom of encouraging 
countries to adopt deposit insurance without first remedying observable weaknesses in 
their institutional environment and to buttress this challenge by reviewing cross-country 
empirical evidence on the effects of deposit insurance. The next section characterizes the 
data set and uses it to summarize the extent of cross-country differences in deposit 
insurance design.  Section 3 explains why cross-country differences in design are 
appropriate and that differences in the informational and contracting environments of 
individual countries are bound to affect the optimal design.  Section 4 summarizes 
empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance.  Section 5 develops policy 
implications.  
 
2. Deposit Insurance Around the World 
Table 1 documents the many ways in which deposit-insurance design varies 
across countries.
4  An optimal worldwide blueprint is not likely to be found.  For 
example, account coverage varies from unlimited guarantees to tight coverage limits.  On 
the one hand, Mexico, Turkey and Japan promise 100 percent depositor coverage.  
However, countries like Chile, Switzerland, and U.K. cover only an amount of deposits 
that is actually less than their per capita GDP.  Also, although many countries cover 
deposits denominated in foreign currency, most schemes exclude interbank deposits.  
Besides setting a maximum level of coverage, some countries insist that accountholders 
"coinsure" a proportion of their deposit balances.  Coinsurance provisions are still 
relatively rare, but are more frequent in recently adopted schemes.  
                                                 
4   For the complete database, see Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Sobaci (forthcoming) which builds on earlier studies 
by Kyei (1995) and Garcia (1999).  7
Deposit insurance obligations are typically advance-funded, most commonly from 
a mixture of government and bank sources.  To allow the insurer to build and maintain an 
appropriate fund of reserves against its loss exposures, in such countries banks are 
generally assessed an annual premium that is based entirely or in large part on the amount 
of their insured deposits.  Efforts to make these annual premiums sensitive to bank risk 
exposure have begun in recent years.   
Insurance schemes are typically managed in a government agency or in a public-
private partnership.  However, a few countries, such as Switzerland, Germany and 
Argentina, manage their schemes privately.  Finally, in almost all countries, membership 
is compulsory for chartered banks.  The most notable exception is Switzerland. 
Table 1 also records the establishment dates of each country￿s scheme.   A 
number of countries adopted or expanded their deposit insurance scheme during crises. 
For example, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea moved to blanket coverage in response to 
their recent crises.  The 1990s saw a rapid spread in transitional countries ￿ perhaps 
partly motivated by their long-term interest in joining the EU ￿ and in some African 
countries.   Countries that adopted deposit insurance in 1999 are Ecuador, El Salvador, 
and as part of the Central African Currency Union, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo.   Most of these new schemes 
show generous coverage levels.  For example, Central African Republic and Chad have 
coverage ratios that lie between 13 and 15 times their GDP per capita. 
Precisely because the range of design features is so extensive, the data set can 
permit analysts to compare and contrast how well different features work in different 
circumstances.  Section 4 of this paper summarizes the implications of research that uses 





3.  Deposit Insurance Design: Can One Size Fit All? 
Figure 2 underscores the trend in adopting explicit deposit insurance. The identity 
of the countries listed in Table 1 clarifies that the use of this policy instrument is growing 
especially fast in developing countries. Whether this is a healthy trend depends on the 
balance of  deposit insurance costs and benefits in particular countries.  In countries 
whose governments have a strong system for collecting taxes or substantial access to 
foreign credit, the primary benefit of establishing a deposit insurance scheme is to 
eliminate the immediate threat of financial panic.  Since all countries have a safety net, 
where rigorous enforcement of coverage ceilings is feasible, deposit insurance can cap 
the government￿s future commitments to depositors of insolvent institutions.  Similarly, 
offering deposit insurance may allow a government to negotiate increased rights to 
intervene in a timely fashion into the affairs of insolvent institutions.  Protecting 
unsophisticated small depositors and helping small banks to compete with large ones are 
often categorized as secondary benefits.  
Besides the budgeted costs of running an insurance enterprise, adopting deposit 
insurance generates unbudgeted indirect costs.  The  major indirect cost of deposit 
insurance comes from its potential to subsidize inefficient types of bank risk-taking.  The 
danger that insurance will induce a willful increase in inappropriate risk-taking is called 
moral hazard.  The increase in risk-taking is described as willful because it responds to 
the extent that a given scheme undermines pre-existing incentives of depositors to  9
monitor and police bank risk-taking.  To control taxpayers￿ exposure to moral hazard, the 
insurer must involve itself or surrogate parties in monitoring and disciplining banks.  The 
balance of benefits and costs engendered by individual deposit insurance features is 
bound to vary with the character of insurer loss control and how this loss control interacts 
with weaknesses in the informational and contracting environments of individual 
countries.  
Kane (2000) emphasizes that controlling bank risk-taking requires transparency 
and deterrency, and that assuring that an insurer acts efficiently requires accountability to 
taxpayers for successes and failures. Complete transparency is obtained when institutions 
disclose information that perfectly and costlessly informs either bank creditors or 
supervisors about changes in a bank’s financial condition and risk-taking.  Perfect 
deterrency describes a situation where individual creditors or supervisors can 
immediately understand the implications of information flows and can protect themselves 
completely and costlessly from any adverse consequences.  Perfect accountability occurs 
when taxpayers can identify the actions of government officials and hold them fully 
responsible for the outcomes their actions engender. 
Transparency, deterrency and accountability are dimensions of a country’s 
institutional environment.  High readings on these dimensions assure that counterparties 
in private and public sectors can enforce appropriate bank behavior by evaluating bank 
activities, disciplining their risk-taking, and resolving their financial difficulties promptly.  
Around the globe, large differences exist in each of these contracting features.  Across 
countries and cultures, proxies for transparency, deterrency and accountability tend to 
increase with per capita GDP (Kane, 2000), but other elements of social capital play a 
role as well.  10
Safety nets seek to prevent social costs of financial disruption and government 
intervention from exceeding the social benefits of damage mitigation. Safety-net design --
and deposit insurance arrangements in particular-- must address the particular weaknesses 
that exist in the institutional environment of individual countries.  Recognizing that 
contracting environments tend to become more diverse as per capita income falls has two 
consequences. First, it implies that recommending a single combination of "best-practice" 
design features may generate counterproductive consequences in many developing 
countries.  Second, for countries in which transparency, deterrency and accountability are 
very weak, implementing an efficient explicit deposit insurance scheme may simply be 
impossible. 
Three central dimensions of every country’s deposit-insurance system are: the 
extent to which it relies on private management and/or private funding; the breadth of its 
formal and informal coverages; and its susceptibility to hidden risk-shifting by insolvent 
banks.  In moving to a system of explicit guarantees, conscientious government officials 
must adopt coverage, funding, and managerial structures that efficiently mitigate the 
particular weaknesses in transparency, deterrency, and accountability that left their 
country vulnerable to financial crises in the past. 
The harder it has been for depositors to observe the economic value of bank 
capital and the character of bank risk-taking, the more important it becomes for regulators 
to establish informative protocols for reporting the performance and financial condition 
of insured banks.  If the country’s system of corporate governance previously gave 
depositors few protections against risk shifting, officials must enact special deterrent 
rights for the insurer.  Finally, the less accountability the political system imposes on  11
public officials generally, the more accountable deposit-insurance managers must be for 
accurately measuring the incremental social value their activities produce. 
Historically, in environments that combine low transparency with low deterrency, 
it has made sense to extend stockholder liability for bank losses beyond the amount of 
paid-in capital in closely held banks (Kane and Wilson, 2001) and to make large 
depositors and substantial nondeposit creditors effectively coinsure bank losses.  In low-
accountability environments, deposit-insurance managers need contractual incentives to 
optimize the degree of transparency and deterrency that they, minority shareholders, and 
coinsuring depositors receive.  In environments that are low in accountability and 
transparency, private participation in funding and management can help to create the 
incentives needed to discipline safety-net loss exposures.   To the extent that insurer 
performance can be measured meaningfully, it is useful to establish a fund of deferred 
compensation for top managers with the payoffs tied to appropriate measures of deposit-
insurance performance during their particular term in office. 
As transparency, deterrency, and accountability evolve through time, so should 
the design features of a country’s safety net.  To maintain efficiency over time, the system 
must respond to fluctuations in private and government regulators’ capacity for valuing 
institutions, for disciplining risk-taking and resolving insolvencies promptly, and for 
being appropriately rewarded or chastised for how well they perform these tasks. 
Kane (2000) also discusses the dangers of using blanket deposit guarantees as a 
way of dealing with banking crises.   In managing a crisis, the urgency of stopping a 
panic must not be allowed to over-ride the need to identify hopelessly insolvent 
institutions and cut off their opportunities to expand their risk-taking.  To end a panic 
efficiently, liquidity must be offered only to potentially solvent institutions.    12
Indiscriminately issuing government guarantees and other forms of bailout support 
rewards bad bankers and penalizes good ones.  Because such a policy perverts market 
discipline and risk-taking incentives and imposes unbooked obligations on the national 
treasury, it promises new and deeper crises in years to come.  
 
4. Deposit Insurance: Theory and Empirical Evidence 
An extensive theoretical literature analyzes the benefits and costs of deposit 
insurance and explores the challenge of balancing these benefits and costs to produce an 
optimal deposit-insurance system.  This literature has been summarized by Kane (2000), 
Calomiris (1996), and others.   
However, cross-country empirical evidence on the efficiency of real-world 
deposit-insurance systems has been harder to come by.  We begin this section by posing 
four empirical questions whose answers indicate how effective an individual country’s 
deposit-insurance system happens to be. The four questions are: 
•  How does deposit insurance affect bank stability? 
•  How does deposit insurance affect market discipline? 
•  How does deposit insurance impact financial development? 
•  What role does deposit insurance play in managing crises? 
We go on to identify pertinent literature bearing on each question and to review empirical 
evidence on how the answer to each question varies across different countries and 
contracting environments. 
 
How does explicit deposit insurance affect bank stability?   13
In the midst of a systemic crisis, expanding or firming up depositor guarantees has 
great appeal to policymakers as a crisis-mitigating device.  However, the deferred costs 
of treating a crisis myopically can be substantial.  The best long-run way to incorporate 
deposit insurance into a country’s safety net is a matter of controversy among economists.  
A classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) frames deposit insurance as an optimal 
policy in a contracting environment where limited transparency allows bank stability to 
be threatened by self-fulfilling depositor runs and runs on solvent banks are depositors’ 
only deterrent instrument for reducing their loss exposure.  In Allen and Gale (1998), 
greater transparency allows runs to be triggered only by an actual deterioration in bank 
asset quality.  In this higher-transparency environment, the optimal safety-net strategy is 
to use central-bank loans to supply liquidity to the banking system.   
Precisely because safety nets are so effective in arresting runs, safety nets 
generate moral hazard.  This moral hazard comes both from banks and their regulators.  
Opportunistic bankers can exploit weaknesses in supervisory transparency and deterrency 
by taking inefficient risks and even engaging in fraudulent activity.  In practice, 
regulators and politicians who control the supervisory elements of the safety net often 
have insufficient incentive to monitor and enforce prudential regulations. Kane (1989) 
shows that regulatory activity encouraged risk-taking by insured thrift institutions during 
the U.S. S&L debacle.   
Incentives for risk-shifting and looting by banks decline with bank capital and 
with transparency, deterrency, and accountability.  Transparency and bank capital tend to 
decline in the face of adverse economic shocks (Merton, 1977 and Calomiris, 1990).   
Looting often takes the form of bankers making loans to themselves or related parties at  14
below-market terms.  As a bank’s capital becomes exhausted, the costs of corrupt lending 
fall more and more on the safety net (Akerlof and Romer, 1993).  
Economic theory offers a mixed message.  On the one hand, credible deposit 
insurance contributes to financial stability by making depositor runs less likely.  On the 
other hand, unless insured institutions’ capital positions and risk-taking are supervised 
carefully, the insurer will accrue loss exposures that undermine bank stability in the long 
run.  Because deposit-insurance theory embraces good and bad outcomes, it is critical to 
explore empirical evidence.  Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) are the first to use 
the cross-county database to study the link between deposit insurance and financial 
crises.  They use data from 61 countries for the period 1980-1997 to estimate a model of 
banking crisis.  After controlling for other determinants, they find that the presence of 
poorly designed explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood that a country 
will experience a banking crisis and that this result does not appear to be driven by 
reverse causality.  
Recognizing that the design of explicit deposit insurance varies significantly 
across countries, Demirg￿￿ -Kunt and Detragiache (DKD) focus on whether and how 
individual design features mitigate the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank 
stability.  The regression experiment reproduced in Table 2 shows that deposit insurance 
causes the most trouble in countries where coverage is extensive, where authorities amass 
a large fund of explicit reserves and earmark it for insolvency resolution, and where the 
scheme is administered by government officials rather than the private sector.   These 
findings underscore the importance of confronting squarely the moral hazard that deposit 
insurance threatens to generate.  DKD also show that the contribution of  deposit 
insurance to bank fragility is significant in countries where the institutional environment  15
lacks transparency and deterrency, but is not significant in countries whose environment 
is strong.  These findings support the hypothesis that where the contracting environment 
controls incentive conflict, effective prudential regulation and supervision can offset the 
adverse incentives created by deposit insurance so that moral hazard need not be 
worrisome.     
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find that DKD￿s deposit insurance evidence is  not 
robust to the twin effects of omitting developed countries from their sample and 
employing a single-dimensional dummy variable to capture the existence of explicit 
deposit insurance.  This finding is not truly inconsistent with DKD whose results are 
significant when they incorporate deposit insurance design features and institutional 
characteristics into their analysis.  On average, the more a system embraces features that 
intensify moral hazard, the more vulnerable it is to banking crisis.
 5  
However, DKD only imperfectly control for the other components of the financial 
safety net, particularly for variation in the quality of regulatory and supervisory 
enforcement.  DKD proxy the quality of regulation and supervision by institutional 
indicators such as bureaucratic quality, bureaucratic delay, lack of corruption, and the 
quality of contract enforcement and legal efficiency.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
compile a comprehensive data base on regulation and supervision of commercial banks 
and confirm DKD￿s findings controlling for variation in the character of government 
oversight.   
  Policymakers should view the positive correlation between explicit deposit 
insurance and banking crises as a wakeup call.  Credible deposit insurance allows banks 
to gather deposits regardless of the risks they take.  We would expect a positive  16
correlation if deposit insurance greatly reduces monitoring by private parties and replaces 
it by ineffective regulatory and supervisory discipline.  In countries with strong 
institutions, we would expect most or all of this reduction in depositor monitoring to be 
compensated by official monitoring, so that the impact of deposit insurance on bank 
fragility would not prove significant.  But is there any direct evidence of the impact of 




How does deposit insurance affect market discipline? 
In high-transparency environments, depositors can discipline banks that engage in 
excessive risk-taking by demanding higher deposit interest rates or by withdrawing their 
deposits.  However, to the extent that deposit insurance reduces the stake that depositors 
have in monitoring and policing bank capital and loss exposures, it shifts responsibility 
for controlling bank risk-taking to the regulatory system.  Wherever deposit-insurance 
managers displace more discipline than they exert, bank performance is undermined.  To 
understand this, we must investigate two questions:  
•  How do depositors exert market discipline? 
•  How does deposit insurance lessen depositor discipline? 
Evidence on market discipline as reflected in bank interest cost comes primarily 
from U.S. experience.  Flannery (1998) surveys research on how the interest cost of 
uninsured bank deposits and other debt instruments in the U.S. responds to observable 
measures of default risk.  In the U.S., balances in excess of $100,000 are not insured.  
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Typically, researchers find that interest rates paid on these partially insured instruments 
(certificates of deposits, CDs) increase significantly with bank riskiness (Baer and 
Brewer 1986, Hannan and Hanweck 1988, and Brewer and Mondschean 1994).  Linking 
movements in CD rates to bank-specific news embedded in movements in stock prices, 
Ellis and Flannery (1992) show that bank CD rates respond generally to market 
perceptions of bank-specific risks.  
Cook and Spellman (1994) find that, even on fully insured deposits, risk 
premiums at U.S. savings and loan associations (S&Ls) responded to individual-
institution risk factors in 1987.  This sensitivity to risk emerged because the deep 
economic insolvency of their federal guarantor was becoming clear at that time.  These 
premiums served simultaneously to rein in gambling by aggressive S&Ls and their 
insolvent insurer. This evidence indicates that inadequacies in supervision and insurer net 
worth can reduce the credibility of an insurer’s guarantees.  
Moving beyond depositor reactions, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) study market 
yield spreads between uninsured bank debentures and callable treasury bonds.  These 
spreads showed significant sensitivity to bank risk during the years 1989-1991 when the 
mess was being cleaned up.  This was also a time when doubts were emerging about 
whether the FDIC could or would fully rescue creditors of insolvent bank holding 
companies.  The importance of variation in the credibility of implicit and explicit 
guarantees is supported in a negative way by the behavior of spreads on bank derivatives 
in the less stressful era of 1983-1984.  Analyzing data from that era, Avery, Belton and 
Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990) failed to uncover any risk sensitivity.  
Apparently, interest costs on insured deposits and uninsured instruments discipline 
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depository institutions ever more strongly when doubts arise about the insurer’s ability to 
cover its guarantees.  Such doubts are endemic to developing countries and can accelerate 
quickly. 
Evidence on whether the deposit growth of banks is retarded by default risk 
premiums is available from a wide spectrum of countries and time periods. Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1990) explain why we should expect deposit growth to slow at a troubled 
institution.  Statistical analysis uncovers similar patterns around the world.  Martinez-
Peria and Schmukler (1998), find that deposits at banks in Argentina, Chile and Mexico 
respond negatively to risk measures generated from accounting data.  They also show that 
in Chile, where deposit insurance appeared most credible, uninsured depositors were 
effective monitors of bank risk.   
Examining a sample of New York City banks in the 1920s and 1930s, Calomiris 
and Wilson (1998) show that depositors successfully discriminated among banks on the 
basis of their riskiness and tended to shift funds to safer havens.  Similarly, Kane (1987) 
reports that when the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) fell into crisis in 1985, Ohio 
depositors removed funds only from ODGF-insured institutions.  Park (1995) and Park 
and Peristiani (1998) show that, during the 1980s, deposit growth at individual U.S. 
thrifts was negatively related to their estimated probability of default, so that riskier 
thrifts experienced smaller deposit growth. 
Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Huizinga (DKH, 2000) build a bank-level dataset covering 
43 countries over 1990-1997, and study both dimensions of depositor discipline by 
looking at interest rates and deposit growth.  The evidence shows that explicit insurance 
lowers banks￿ interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk 
and liquidity.  However, regardless of the character of a country￿s safety net, some  19
market discipline survives.  Consistent with the U.S. evidence on interest sensitivity, the 
market discipline DKH can observe responds to gaps in coverage, weaknesses in the 
credibility of the guarantees, and delays and other costs entailed in recovering funds from 
the guarantor. 
DKH particularly focus on how variation in design characteristics affect market 
discipline.  They find that market discipline is stronger in countries with higher levels of 
institutional development.  Nevertheless, even in countries whose institutional 
development is strong, badly designed deposit insurance curtails market discipline.  
Setting higher coverage limits, extending coverage to interbank deposits, establishing an 
ex-ante fund of reserves, funding reserves from government sources, and insisting on 
public management each displaces market discipline.  On the other hand, market 
discipline is enhanced by coinsurance provisions, covering foreign currency deposits, and 
establishing private or joint management of the insurance enterprise. 
The value deposit insurance offers banks and their creditors can be measured by 
the reduction it creates in required interest rates.  Society pays for increases in the 
perceived safety of deposits by accepting the administrative costs of supervising banks 
and the consequences of any net reduction in market discipline.  ￿Correct￿ pricing 
through insurance premia could in principle eliminate risk shifting, but such pricing is 
politically and administratively difficult, especially in developing countries.  Leaven 
(2001) extracts estimates of annual implicit subsidies to banks for a sample of 14 
countries from market prices of  bank stock.   He finds that the cost of deposit insurance 
is highly country-specific, being highest in countries with low per-capita GDP and poor 
institutional environments. German banks take very low risks and accrue the smallest  
gross subsidies from deposit insurance.  This reinforces the conclusions reached by Beck  20
(2001) in his case study of German deposit insurance.  Beck finds that private 
management, mutual liability and the anti-bankruptcy bias curb risk-taking incentives at 
German banks.
6 
Such individual-bank data provide direct evidence of the way in which deposit 
insurance design can affect bank risk-taking incentives.  Although deposit insurance 
displaces market discipline even in advanced countries, the net effect may be improved 
by strong regulation and supervision.  These findings reinforce the evidence on deposit 
insurance and banking crises.  Countries with poor contracting environments are most 
likely to suffer adverse consequences from deposit insurance.   
Some argue that in institutionally underdeveloped countries explicit deposit 
insurance may have other advantages that offset its negative effects on market discipline 
and systemic stability.  Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998) maintain that the principal 
benefit of deposit insurance is to provide a risk-free asset to small savers.  Critics of this 
view point out that this benefit may be obtained without destabilization costs by issuing 
assets such as postal savings or money market funds backed by government debt 
(Calomiris, 1996, Stiglitz, 1992), or by insisting that banks issuing insured deposits could 
be constrained to remain ￿narrow￿ banks.   A second and specifically evolutionary view 
maintains that in countries with underdeveloped institutions, deposit insurance may be 
expected to create a launching pad for improving the banking system so that it performs 
financial intermediation more efficiently.  We examine empirical evidence on this 
hypothesis in the next section.  
 
How Does Deposit Insurance Impact Financial Development? 
                                                 
6 The first two factors can also explain the good performance of the U.S. scheme for insuring credit unions  21
Countries adopt deposit insurance for different reasons.  However, a common 
reason is to increase the flow of bank credit by increasing the confidence that the general 
public has in the formal banking system without having to explicitly raise or expend 
current fiscal resources.  To the extent that deposit insurance bolsters depositors￿ faith in 
the stability of the banking system, it may mobilize household savings for use by the 
financial system.  The question is whether or not the funds mobilized go on to support 
improved patterns of investment and sustainably higher aggregate economic growth. 
Recent adopters of deposit insurance have included African and Latin American 
countries with low levels of financial development.
   To investigate whether and how 
explicit deposit insurance contributes to financial development, Cull, Senbet and Sorge 
(2000) examine time-series data for 58 countries.  These authors find that explicit deposit 
insurance favorably impacts the level of financial activity and its volatility only in the 
presence of strong institutional development.   If deposit-insurance arrangements do not 
include a regulatory scheme that can overcome weaknesses in the institutional 
environment, instability is fostered and subsequent financial development is harmed.   
Examining a cross section of 49 countries,  Cecchetti and Krause (2000) show that 
deposit insurance retards the evolution of nonbank financing mechanisms.  Countries 
with more extensive bank deposit insurance tend to have smaller capital and financial 
markets and a lower number of publicly traded firms per capita.   
Thus, in institutionally weak environments, deposit insurance appears to retard 
rather than to foster financial development.  Cross-country research underscores the long-
run danger facing countries that adopt explicit deposit insurance without stopping to 
repair demonstrable inadequacies in their contracting environments.  This evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Kane and Hendershott, 1996).  22
amounts to a caution flag for authorities considering whether to adopt deposit insurance.  
Their decision making process should begin with an audit of the degree of transparency, 
deterrency, and accountability present in their institutional framework.  Good safety-net 
design does not consist of merely copying what works in developed countries.  Good 
design adapts itself to the need to mitigate problems specific to a country￿s framework for 
financial contracting.   Officials often act as if institutional audits and country-specific 
adaptations may be set aside in times of crisis.  According to this view, countries whose 
creditors pressure them to adopt deposit insurance in the midst of a financial crisis have 
little opportunity to think about longer-term consequences.  It is fair to ask whether 
provision of blanket deposit insurance is of much help in managing crises.  Again, we 
turn to empirical evidence. 
 
What Role Does Deposit Insurance Play in Managing Crises? 
It is common practice to issue blanket guarantees to arrest a banking crisis.  
Countries adopting this strategy include Sweden (1992), Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), 
Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), and Indonesia (1998).  More recently, Turkey tried to 
halt its financial panic by guaranteeing not just bank depositors, but all domestic and 
foreign nondeposit creditors of Turkish banks. 
Advocates of using blanket guarantees to halt a systemic crisis argue that 
sweeping guarantees can be helpful, even essential, in halting depositors￿ flight to 
quality.  However, because blanket guarantees create an expectation of their future use in 
similar circumstances, they undermine market discipline and may prove greatly 
destabilizing over longer periods.  Although some countries have managed to scale back  23
formal insurance coverage once a crisis has receded, it is very difficult to scale back 
informal coverage in a credible manner. 
It is clear that a policy of credibly extending blanket guarantees is sufficient to 
stop a depositor run.  However, for governments in developing countries, establishing 
and subsequently maintaining the credibility of its guarantees is a costly matter.  
Extensive government guarantees shift accrued losses and loss exposures from bank 
stakeholders to taxpayers.  The fiscal cost of making good on blanket guarantees is an 
implicit government expenditure that generates an equal amount of implicit government 
debt.  This unbooked spending and unbooked debt subtly undermine the country’s 
foreign-exchange reserves.  Hence, in countries whose fiscal capacity is weak, financially 
sophisticated parties face continuing incentives to move wealth offshore.  If this capital 
flight begins soon enough, blanket guarantees may not work even in the short run without 
extensive outside support.   
Even if successful in stopping an immediate crisis, introducing guarantees to stop 
a crisis creates the expectation of similar bailouts in future crises.  The more frequently 
this remedy is used and the more enthusiastically it is approved by foreign and 
multinational institutions, the harder it becomes for banks and their creditors to take 
seriously post-crisis attempts to roll formal coverages back to less-disruptive levels.  
Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) analyze the impact of blanket guarantees and other crisis-
management strategies on the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving banking-system distress.  
Data covering forty crises around the world indicate that unlimited depositor guarantees, 
open-ended liquidity support, and regulatory forbearance significantly increase the 
ultimate fiscal cost of resolving a banking crisis.  Moreover, these authors find no trade-
off between fiscal costs and the speed of economic recovery.  In their sample, depositor  24
guarantees and regulatory forbearance failed to significantly reduce either crisis duration 
or the crisis-induced decline in aggregate real output.  Providing liquidity support for 
insolvent institutions appears to prolong a crisis by destabilizing bank-lending incentives 
so extensively that healthy adjustments are delayed and additional output loss is 
generated.   
Even in the midst of a crisis, it is inefficient to sacrifice long-term goals to resolve 
immediate pressures.  Efficient crisis management begins with triage.  Hopelessly 
insolvent institutions must be identified and their risk-taking brought under control.  
Providing open-ended liquidity support to moribund institutions and extending blanket 
guarantees to their creditors is apt to spawn new and more-virulent crises down the line.  
Even when conceived entirely as a temporary emergency measure, blanket deposit-
insurance guarantees engender high fiscal costs.  Incurring these costs is unlikely to help 
the real economy to recover faster from banking crisis or to experience a smaller output 
loss.  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The  empirical research reviewed here answers two main questions:  
•  Whether some countries would do well to avoid explicit deposit insurance all 
together? 
•  How should deposit-insurance design respond to cross-country differences in 
transparency, deterrency, and accountability? 
Should every country adopt explicit deposit insurance?    
Cross-country empirical research on deposit insurance strongly supports the 
hypothesis that in institutionally weak environments, poorly designed deposit-insurance  25
arrangements tend to increase the probability of future banking crises.  This finding is 
statistically robust, in that it emerges using different data sets and two very different 
research protocols.   When researchers compare the incidence of observed banking crises 
in different countries around the world, countries with poorly designed explicit deposit-
insurance systems are found to experience more crises.  Moreover, the frequency of these 
crises is worse in countries that have weak contracting environments.  When researchers 
focus instead on bank-level interest costs and deposit growth in different countries, net 
private and government monitoring of banks proves decisively weaker in poorly designed 
systems. 
The most plausible interpretation of these results is that governments should  
address weaknesses in their transparency, deterrency, and accountability before adopting 
explicit deposit insurance schemes.   Improving banking regulation and supervision, 
reforming the legal system such that property rights are protected and contract 
enforcement is strengthened, upgrading accounting and disclosure rules so that accurate 
information reaches the markets in a timely fashion exemplify the kinds of institutional 
reforms that improve incentive structures and limit excess risk-taking.   
  In poor contracting environments, risk-shifting is magnified because insurance-
induced reductions in private monitoring are intensified by deficiencies in the nature of 
official monitoring.  Banks are tempted to exploit monitoring weakness by issuing 
insured deposits and using them to finance projects with substantial downside risks.  As 
the expanding value of unbooked guarantees subtly exhausts the fiscal capacity of the 
government, the fragility of a country’s financial system increases.  Although government 
officials have often been led to believe that deposit insurance helps to develop a robust 
financial system, it cannot do this unless the contracting environment can support it.   26
Poor supervision leads banks to lend on positively skewed, but negative present-value 
projects.  Such lending undermines bank solvency, destroys real economic capital, and 
deters financial development. 
Cross-country empirical research verifies the importance of a nation’s financial-
contracting environment.  A country must prepare itself to support explicit deposit 
insurance in an efficient manner.  Governments that are thinking of adopting deposit 
insurance must recognize that a strong contracting environment is a precondition. Indeed, 
if a country’s contracting environment is not characterized by a reasonable degree of 
transparency, accountability and deterrency, an explicit deposit insurance scheme is 
likely to do more harm than good. For countries with weak institutions, adopting explicit 
deposit insurance promises at best to assist financial development only in the very short 
run.  Over longer periods, it is likely to undermine market discipline, aggravate moral 
hazard and intensify financial fragility.  This policy conclusion is distressingly relevant 
because many of the countries recently adopting explicit deposit insurance have a 
demonstrably poor contracting environment. 
 
How should explicit deposit insurance be designed? 
Cross-country empirical research offers lessons for countries that have installed or 
are in the process of adopting explicit deposit-insurance schemes.  Even in favorable 
circumstances, using explicit deposit insurance to increase depositor confidence threatens 
to heighten financial fragility by reducing the degree of market discipline that banks 
experience.  However, appropriate design features can both control and offset these 
effects to minimize social costs.    27
Empirical research supports the hypothesis that the following features enhance 
market discipline and reduce moral hazard: 
•  Credibly low coverage limits per account 
•  Narrow coverage (e.g., excluding interbank deposits) 
•  Coinsurance (and alternative private loss-sharing arrangements such as subordinated 
debt and extended stockholder liability) 
•  Compulsory membership 
•  Ex-post funding 
•  Targeting surviving banks to cover losses (although taxpayers may be asked to assist 
banks in a truly systemic crisis) 
•  Private-public joint management 
The advantages of credibly limiting insurance coverage and requiring compulsory 
membership are obvious and not at all controversial.  Limiting coverage in a believable 
way ensures that identifiable groups of private individuals ￿ large depositors, 
subordinated debtholders or other banks ￿understand that their funds are inescapably at 
risk.  This exposure to loss gives them an incentive to monitor the behavior of both banks 
and safety-net managers.  Compulsory membership increases the size of the insurance 
pool and prevents low-risk institutions from selecting out of the system.  This means that 
low-risk, well-managed banks can help officials to monitor and police high-flying 
competitors.   
The preference for ex-post funding and private involvement in insurance design 
and management is inevitably a harder sell.  On the one hand, not having immediate 
access to a pool of accumulated liquid reserves threatens to delay authorities from dealing 
with insolvent institutions in a timely manner.  However, cross-country evidence 
indicates that in weak institutional environments the net economic value of deposit-
insurance reserves is routinely overstated by failing to account for the implicit liabilities  28
that weak and insolvent clients implicitly shift onto these reserves.  Indeed, an overvalued 
fund tends to intensify moral hazard by leading depositors and competing institutions to 
ignore evidence of individual bank insolvencies.   
Even if left unfunded, a country’s deposit-insurance scheme could still be given 
immediate access to a credit line either from its national treasury or from reinsurance 
contracts written with reliable outside insurers.  In weak contracting environments, it is 
useful to assign additional decision-making units, such as the treasury or foreign 
reinsurers, meaningful responsibility for overseeing design and management decisions.  
Irrespective of whether net deposit-insurance losses are funded ex ante or ex post, it must 
be made clear that funds to cover losses will come principally from surviving banks.  
Otherwise, government backup threatens to reduce market discipline and increase 
fragility. 
Empirical evidence also indicates that involving private parties in managing 
deposit-insurance arrangements reduces moral hazard and fragility.  While private 
managers can also shirk their duties and even misappropriate funds, stakeholders in any 
private scheme have strong incentives to monitor and police managerial actions.  
Finally, the importance of the research summarized here is to focus attention on 
the need to identify institutional prerequisites for adopting deposit insurance and to make 
a concerted effort to get system’s design right.  Cross-country research does not show that 
deposit insurance is universally a mistake or that all countries with explicit systems 
should abandon their scheme at the first opportunity.  In countries where the contracting 
environment is well developed, systemic problems are rare and correlations between 
design features and crises are weaker and often insignificant.    29
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Table 1. Deposit Insurance Around the World : Design of Explicit Deposit Insurance 
Countries Date  Enacted 
/ Revised 






Annual Premiums  Source of 
Funding 
 Administration 




 % of insured deposits 
unless otherwise noted 




30000  3  N  Y  risk-based, 0.36 to 
0.72 
P P 
Austria  1979/1996  $24,075 but coinsurance 
for businesses 
1  Y  N  pro rata, expost  J  P 
Bahrain 1993  5640  1  N  N  ex  post  P  J 
Bangladesh 1984  2123  6  N  Y  0.005  J  O 
Belgium  1974/1995  15,000 ECU until year 
2000 
1  N  Y  0.02 + 0.04 of insured 
liabilities 
J J 
Brazil 1995  17000  4  N  Y  0.3  P  P 
Bulgaria  1995  1784  1  N  Y  risk based to 0.5  J  J 
Cameroon  1999  5336  9  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% of 
deposits + 0.5% of net 
non-performing loans 
J J 
Canada 1967  40770  2  N  Y  0.33  max  J  O 
Central 
African Rep. 
1999  3557  13  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% of 
deposits + 0.5% of net 
non-performing loans 
J J 
Chad  1999  3557  15  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% of 
deposits + 0.5% of net 
non-performing loans 
J J 
Chile  1986  demand deposits in full 
and 90% coinsurance to 
UF 120 of $3,600 for 
savings deposits 
1 Y N  none  O  O 
Colombia  1985  in full untill 2001, then 
coinsurance to $5,500 
2 Y Y  0.3  P  O 
Croatia 1997  15300  3  N  Y  0.8  J  J 
Czech Rep.  1994  coinsurance to $11,756  2  Y  Y  commercial banks 0.5, 
savings banks 0.1 
J O 
Denmark  1988/1998  20000 ECU  1  N  Y  0.2 (maximum)  J  J 
Dominican 
Republic 
1962  coinsurance to $13,000  7  Y  Y  0.1875  J  J 
Ecuador  1999  in full to year 2001  N  Y  0.65  n.a.  O 
El Salvador  1999  4720  2  N  Y  risk-based, 0.1 to 0.3  J  O 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1999  3557  3  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% of 
deposits + 0.5% of net 
non-performing loans 
J J 
Estonia  1998  coinsurance 90% of 
$1383, but 20,000 ECU 
in year 2010 
0 Y Y  0.5  (maximum)  J  J 
Finland 1969/1992/ 
1998 
29435  1  N  Y  risk based: 0.05 to 0.3  J  P 
France  1980/1995  65387  3  N  N  on demand but limited  P  P 
Gabon  1999  5336  1  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% 





private: 30% of capital; 
official coinsurance 90% 
to 20000 ECU 
1  Y  Y  official is 0.03 but can 
be doubled 
P P 
Gibraltar  1998  lesser of 90% coinsurance or 20,000 
ECU 
Y N  administrative 
expenses and expost 
contributions 
P J 
Greece  1993/1995  20,000 ECU  2  N  Y  decreasing by size: 
1.250 to 0.025 
P J 
Hungary  1993   4,165 ECU or $4,564  1  N  Y  risk based to 0.3  J  J 
Iceland 1985/1996  20,000  ECU  1 Y Y  0.15  P  O 
India 1961  2355  6  N  Y  0.05  J O 
Indonesia 1998  Blanket  guarantee             
Ireland  1989/1995  coinsurance 90% to 
15,000 ECU 
1 Y Y  0.2  P  O 
Italy  1987/1996  125000  6  N  N  risk adj., expost 0.4 to 
0.8 of protected funds 
J J 
Jamaica 1998  5512  2  N  Y  0.1  J  O 
               36
Countries Date  Enacted 
/ Revised 






Annual Premiums  Source of 
Funding 
 Administration 
Japan  1971  $71,000, but in full until March 2001  N  Y  0.0048 + 0.036  J  J 
Kenya 1985  1750  5  N  Y  0.15  J  O 
Korea  1996  $14,600, but in full until the year 
2000 
N Y  0.05  J  O 
Latvia  1998  $830 until year 2000  0  N  Y  0.3  J  O 
Lebanon 1967  3300  1  N  Y  0.05  J  J 
Lithuania  1996  $6,250 then coinsurance  2  Y  Y  1.5  J  O 
Luxembourg  1989  coinsurance 90% to 
ECU 15000 thru 1999, 
then to ECU 20000 
0 Y N  ex  post  P  P 
Macedonia  1996  coinsurance 75% to 
$183 
0  Y  Y  1.5%, risk-based 1% 
to 5% 
J J 
Malaysia 1998  Blanket  guarantee             
Marshall 
Islands 
1975  100000    N  Y  risk-based, 0.00 to 
0.27 
P O 
Mexico  1986/1990  in full except subordinated debt until 
2005 
N  Y  0.3 (max 0.5) plus 0.7 
as needed 
J O 
Micronesia  1963  100000    N  Y  risk-based, 0.00 to 
0.27 
P O 
Netherlands 1979/1995  20,000  ECU  1  N  N expost  J  O 
Nigeria 1988/1989  $588(at  market 
exchange rate), $2435 
(at official exchange 
rate) 
2 N Y  0.9375  J  O 
Norway  1961/1997  260800  8  N  Y  0.005 of assets and 
0.01 of total deposits 
J P 
Oman  1995  coinsurance 75% to 
$52,630 
9 Y Y  0.02  J  O 
Peru  1992  21160  9  N  Y  risk-based from 0.65 
to 1.45 
J J 
Philippines 1963  2375  3  N  Y  0.2  J  O 
Poland  1995  1,000 ECU, then 90% 
coinsurance for the next 
4,000 ECU 
0  Y  Y  not more than 0.4  J  O 
Portugal 1992/1995  15,000  ECU, 
coinsurance to 45,000 
ECU 
1  Y  Y  risk-based, 0.08 to 





1999  3557  5  N  Y  risk based: 0.15% of 
deposits + 0.5% of net 
non-performing loans 
J J 
Romania  1996  3600  2  N  Y  risk-based: 0.3 to 0.6  J  J 
Slovak 
Republic 
1996  7900  2  N  Y  0.1 to 0.3 for banks  J  J 
Spain  1977/1996  15,000 ECU through 
1999, then 20,000 ECU 
1  N  Y  maximum of 0.2  J  J 
Sri Lanka  1987  1470  2  N  Y  0.15  J  O 
Sweden  1996  28,663 ECU,  $31,412  1  N  Y  risk-based, 0.5 now, 
0.1 later (future date is 
not available) 
J O 
Switzerland 1984/1993  19700  1  N  N on  demand  P  P 
Taiwan 1985  38500  3  N  Y  0.015  J  O 
Tanzania 1994  376  2  N  Y  0.1  J  P 
Thailand 1997  Blanket  guarantee            
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1986 7957  2  N  Y 0.2  J  O 
Turkey  1983  in full    N  Y  risk-based 1.0 to 1.2  J  O 
Uganda 1994  2310  8  N  Y  0.2  J  O 





1982/1995  larger of 90% 
coinsurance to $33,333 
or 22,222 ECU 
1 Y N  on  demand  P  P 
United States  1934/1991  100000  3  N  Y  risk-based, 0.00 to 
0.27 
J O 
Venezuela 1985  7309  2 N Y  2  J  O 
 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci, ￿Deposit Insurance Around the World: A Database,￿ World Bank Economic 
Review, forthcoming. Full data base available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/upcoming/deposit_insurance/home.htm  37
 
Table 2. Deposit Insurance Design and Banking Crises 
The dependent variable is a crisis dummy which takes the value one if there is a crisis and the value zero otherwise.  A logit 
probability model is estimated.  Variables are defined as follows: Explicit coverage limit takes the value 0 if implicit insurance but 
equals coverage limit divided by deposits per capita lagged one period.  Funding variable takes the value 0 if implicit insurance, 1 if 
explicit insurance with no fund, and 2 if explicit insurance with deposit insurance fund.  Management variables take the value 1 if 
private, joint, or official management and zero otherwise, respectively.  The moral hazard index is the first principal component of 
deposit insurance design features: coinsurance, coverage, scope of coverage, type of funding, source of funding, management, and 
membership.  Regression also includes the following control variables that are not reported below: growth, change in terms of trade, 
real interest rates, inflation, M2/reserves, depreciation, past credit growth,  and gdp per capita.  Standard errors are given in 
parentheses.  Source:  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000. 
 






   










  .617 
(1.163) 
 





   . 1 6 1 * *  
(.074) 
     
No.  of  Crises  34 40 39 40 
No.  of  Obs.  827 898 869 898 
%  correct  78 75 75 78 
%  crisis  correct  71 68 64 65 
Model Chi Sq.
  47.03*** 52.30*** 50.32*** 52.06*** 
AIC 257 295 292 295 
** and *** indicate significance at levels of 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 